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What are the prospects for economic development in lagging sub-national 
regions? What are the roles of public infrastructure investments and fiscal 
incentives in influencing the location and performance of industrial activity? To 
examine these questions, we estimate a spatial profit function for industrial 
activity in Brazil that explicitly incorporates infrastructure improvements and 
fiscal incentives in the cost structure of individual firms. We use firm level data 
from the 2001 annual industrial survey along with regional data at the 
microregion level and find that there are considerable cost savings from being 
located in areas with relatively lower transport costs to reach large markets. In 
comparison, fiscal incentives have modest effects in terms of influencing firm 
level costs. Although the results suggest that firms benefit from being in 
locations with good access to markets, we do not suggest that improving inter-
regional connectivity would necessarily assist lagging regions in the short run. 
Improving inter-regional connectivity implicitly reduces a natural tariff barrier so 
firms currently serving large markets and benefiting from economies of scale can 
more easily expand into new markets in competition with local producers. 
Therefore, producers in the leading regions can crowd out local producers, which 
would be detrimental for local production and employment in the lagging region. 
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1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
In response to large and often sustained sub-national regional disparities in economic 
performance and living conditions, many national governments have adopted policies and 
programs to influence the geographic distribution of economic activity and, in the process, 
promote relatively balanced development across regions.
 1  A wide range of instruments has 
been used to promote the growth of backward regions. These include subsidies to capital and 
labor, fiscal incentives, import controls, public expenditures in infrastructure and industrial 
activities, interventions in the location of public sector employment, and the development of 
secondary cities and growth centers. Some of these policy instruments are geographically 
targeted and others are topic or sector specific programs with differentiated spatial effects.  
Although these instruments have been widely used to stimulate regional growth and 
development, very little systematic evidence exists that satisfactorily evaluates the 
effectiveness of these policies and programs.  
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the roles of economic policies and regional 
characteristics in influencing the spatial distribution and performance of economic activity 
across Brazil. We employ two measures of economic policy in the analysis. First, we have 
compiled data on federal fiscal incentives and tax expenditures that are disaggregated by 
state and industrial sector. This metric will enable us to examine the extent to which firms 
respond to federal interventions aimed at influencing location of economic activity. The 
second variable indicates whether a municipio provides fiscal incentives to attract and sustain 
economic activity in the area.
2  
 
  Brazil has a long history of regional disparities. The Brazilian Northeast has 
historically been the poorest region in the country, with per capita incomes about one-half 
those of the prosperous Southeast (Lall and Shalizi, 2003). Per capita income differences 
                                                 
1 These interventions are motivated by regional equity as well as political concerns. 
2 A municipio is a local jurisdiction most analogous in the U.S. to a county or its statistical equivalent because 
they are mutually exclusive and completely exhaust the country.  In 2001, there are 5,507 municipios in Brazil.   4
across regions are relatively large and surprisingly stable over very long periods. Per capita 
income in the Southeast was 2.9 times that of the Northeast in 1939 and 2.8 times in 1992 
(World Bank, 1998). At a finer spatial scale, regional differences in per capita income are 
much more pronounced. For example, per capita income in São Paulo, the wealthiest 
southeastern state, is 7.2 times that of Piaui, the poorest northeastern state. Eight of the 10 
poorest states in the country are in the Northeast and two are in the North region (Azzoni, 
Menezes-Filho, de Menezes, and Silveira-Neto, 2002).  
 
Beyond purely economic measures, social indicators in the Northeast region are also 
considerably worse than the national average. The illiteracy rate is at least three times higher 
than in São Paulo; child mortalities occur at twice the rate of the Southeast, 54.5 per thousand 
in the Northeast compared with 26.3 per 1000 in the Southeast; and life expectancy is four 
years shorter (Ferreira, 2003). However, income inequality is much worse. The Theil 
Coefficient, a measure of inequality, is 0.80 for Ceará, Bahia and Pernambuco, contrasting 
sharply with a value of 0.55 for the state of São Paulo (Ferreira, 2000).  Fifty percent of the 
Northeast population lives in poverty. 
 
Large regional disparities between the Northeast and the rest of the country coupled 
with a severe drought in 1958 stimulated the Brazilian government to develop explicit 
policies for the Northeast (Baer, 1995).  The evolving policies centered on a strategy to 
establish an autonomous center of manufacturing expansion by attracting “dynamic” and 
high-growth industries such as those in metallurgy, machinery, electrical equipment and 
paper products (World Bank, 1987).  Instruments including fiscal incentives, transfers, and 
direct expenditures to improve industrial land and infrastructure were widely used 
(Goldsmith and Wilson, 1991; Markusen, 1994; World Bank, 1987).   
 
Ferreria (2003) reviews various federal interventions designed to reduce regional 
disparities between the lagging Northeast (and the North) and the rest of the country. Former 
regional development agencies such as the Sudene and the Sudam used policy instruments 
including tax and investment credits, long-term financing, infrastructure construction   5
(especially roads and energy), and income tax reductions for businesses in the region.
3 The 
total amount of regional and nonregional fiscal incentives for Northeast industry in 1980 has 
been estimated to be US$376 million, corresponding to approximately 2.5 percent of regional 
manufactured output (World Bank, 1987). 
 
When the Sudene and the Sudam were phased out in the early 1990s, they were 
replaced by a new set of instruments called the “Constitutional Funds.” These investment 
funds collect 3 percent of income and industrial taxes and use it to finance investment in the 
North, Northeast and Center-West regions at subsidized interest rates. The total credit 
provided by the Constitutional Funds from their inception in 1990 to March 2002 is 
estimated to be more than US$10 billion (Ferreira 2003). 
 
Despite a long history of federal interventions to create a dynamic manufacturing 
industry base in the Northeast, evidence of any sustained structural change in the regional 
economy is lacking. In 2001, industrial activity remains concentrated in the Southeast region 
(see Figure 3). Furthermore, Ferreria (2003) estimates that 57.8 percent of Brazil’s GDP is 
produced in the Southeast, which comprises 43 percent of the population, in comparison with 
13.1 percent for the Northeast, where 28 percent of the population resides. Despite some 
anecdotal evidence and a few evaluations suggesting regional convergence, it is difficult to 
attribute this trend to regional programs and policies. Furthermore, the main objective of 
regional policy for the Northeast, creation of a dynamic industrial base, does not appear to 
have materialized. 
 
Our concept of regional characteristics extends beyond so-called natural advantages. 
Rather than focusing on inherent characteristics such as climate and physical distance to the 
coast, we analyze the economic geography of the region, namely the quality of the transport 
network linking the location to market centers; the presence of a diverse supply of buyers and 
suppliers to facilitate inter-industry transfers; the potential for localized production benefits 
such as opportunities for labor market pooling; input-sharing; and knowledge spillovers 
(Marshall, 1890, 1919; Chinitz, 1961; Jacobs, 1969); and amenities offered in the area. 
                                                 
3 The Sudene was the former coordinating body responsible for the management and operation of various 
incentive mechanisms and the Sudam was a similar agency for the Amazon region.   6
Drawing on testable hypotheses from the new economic geography literature (see Krugman, 
1991; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999), this analysis provides the micro-foundations 
for understanding whether a region’s economic geography influences location decisions for 
Brazilian firms. A general framework for evaluating the overall spatial distribution of 
economic activity and employment requires that we first quantify these basic geographic 
determinants of the firm’s spatial profit equation. The basic premise for this analysis is that 
firms will produce goods in a particular location if profits exceed some critical level sought 
by entrepreneurs.  
 
The main questions addressed in this paper are as follows: (a) How do explicit public 
interventions in the form of federal fiscal incentives, i.e., the “political economy,” influence 
economic performance across sub-national regions? And (b) what effect does the “economic 
geography” have on the location and performance of manufacturing activity? Specifically, 
how do infrastructure quality and external economies associated with localization and 
urbanization enter into the manufacturing firm’s spatial profit alternatives? We answer these 
questions using micro-level data from the 2001 Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA), which is 
collected and compiled by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). We 
can obtain accurate micro-level estimates for medium and large-sized firms because the PIA 
is a census for enterprises with 30 or more workers. The IBGE also collects PIA data for a 
sample of enterprises that have less than 30 employees; however, a representative analysis of 
these small firms at the microregion level is not possible because the sampling weights apply 
only to each state. Therefore, we limit our analysis to firms that have 30 or more employees. 
We classify firms into carefully defined industrial sectors and model their activities 
separately to control for heterogeneity in production processes and factor inputs across 
sectors. The categorization also permits identification of differential impacts from economic 
policies and regional geographic externalities that are industry-specific.  We conduct the 
analysis at the three-digit level of the National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE) 
and group firms into 12 manufacturing industries:  
 
1.  Non-durable manufacturing (food, beverages, and tobacco products) 
2.  Garments and textiles 
3. Leather  products   7
4. Wood  products 
5. Printing  and  publishing 
6. Chemicals 
7.  Rubber and plastic 
8. Nonmetallic  minerals 
9. Metals 
10. Mechanical machinery 
11. Electrical and  electronics 
12. Transportation equipment 
 
The enterprise data are supplemented by microregion-level economic data from the 
2001 RAIS and transport cost data from Castro (2002).
 4 The PIA data enable us to identify 
each enterprise’s location as a microregion, the spatial unit of analysis in this paper, and the 
four-digit CNAE code identifying its production activity.  
 
Our analysis finds that improvement in transport infrastructure linking firms to large 
markets has the most important external impact on firm-level costs. In contrast, fiscal 
policies, measured as the level of tax expenditures at the state level, have produced mixed 
results on economic performance. Following this introduction, the remainder of the paper is 
organized in four sections. Section 2 discusses the roles of external economies and fiscal 
incentives in influencing industry location and performance. In addition to providing an 
overview of the issues involved, we discuss how these factors play out in the Brazilian 
context. The empirical strategy is described in Section 3. Results from the empirical analyses 
are presented and discussed in Section 4. Some concluding comments and implications for 






                                                 
4 Data from the Relação Annual de Informações Sociais (RAIS) are compiled by the Brazilian Ministry of 
Earnings and Employment  (Ministerio de Trabalho e Emprego) and contain information on employment, 
enterprises, and earnings by finely disaggregated sectors and spatial scales such as municipios.   8
2 FACTORS INFLUENCING LOCATION AND PERFORMANCE OF INDUSTRY 
 
In this analysis, we are primarily interested in examining the contribution of 
infrastructure investments and fiscal incentives to the location and economic performance of 
industrial activity across Brazilian microregions. We first provide an overview of the various 
ways incentives and public expenditures on infrastructure have been used in attempts to 
influence spatial organization and performance of economic activity. We supplement this 
discussion by describing sources of external economies that may also influence firm level 
productivity or profitability. These sources include (a) own industry concentration 
(localization economies of labor-market pooling and industry-specific knowledge spillovers), 
(b) inter-industry linkages (proximity to intermediate inputs), and (c) regional diversity 
(urbanization economies).   
 
2.1 Fiscal  Incentives 
 
Fiscal incentives have been widely used with the hope of attracting industries and 
stimulating growth in lagging regions. The rationale behind fiscal incentives is to offset the 
costs of firm location that may arise from transport and logistics costs, infrastructure 
conditions, factor price differentials, or a lower level of public services and amenities. In a 
survey of the literature in the academic, business and political press, Kieschnick (1981) 
identifies five reasons for the use of state level tax incentives to attract investment or 
generate employment: 
 
1.  Equalizing interstate differentials that may induce a firm to select an alternative 
business location 
2.  Subsidizing wages to offset the effects of wage rigidity or labor immobility 
3.  Lowering the cost of capital to induce greater overall capital formation independent 
of location choices 
4.  Redistributing income from labor to capital under the politically acceptable guise of 
providing development incentives and  
5.  Sending a signal to out-of-state businesses that the state has generally pro-business 
regulatory and spending policies. 
   9
Although the motivation of providing fiscal incentives is well known, the efficiency 
of their provision is still unclear and their efficacy in influencing location and sustainability 
of economic activity may also be questioned. Fiscal incentives have historically been a major 
part of Brazilian regional development programs. An extensive review of major fiscal 
incentive programs in Brazil is provided in Ferreira (2003).  
 
In general, it is difficult to find spatially detailed and sector specific data on fiscal 
incentives or tax expenditures. For the purpose of this analysis, we worked with the 
Secretaria da Receita Federal in Brazil, the Office of Taxation, to calculate the level of 
federally allocated fiscal incentives within each Brazilian state and for each industry group 
examined in this paper. These fiscal incentives, also known as tax expenditures, are indirect 
government expenditures, or foregone revenues due to reductions in tax liabilities, for the 
purpose of achieving economic goals in specific regions or sectors. These tax expenditures 
do not include liability reductions that are aimed at improving the tax system’s efficiency. 
Fiscal incentives are measured as the difference between a set of reference taxes and actual 
tax revenues that increases the resource availability for production units (firms). Details on 
the variable construction and summary tables are provided in Yepes, Lall, and Salvi (2004). 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of overall federal government fiscal incentives in 2001 by 
state. Clearly, the lion’s share of fiscal incentives is provided in the lagging Northeast and 
North regions.  To complement the measure of state-level fiscal incentives, we include an 
indicator variable that identifies municipios providing fiscal incentives of any type in 2001.
 5  
About 56 percent of Brazilian municipios offered some type of fiscal incentives in 2001. In 









                                                 
5 These data can be downloaded from IBGE’s Profile of Municipal Information at 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/perfil/index.htm   10
2.2  Public Expenditures on Infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure investments have also been broadly attempted in regional development 
policies and programs. Examples of infrastructure-led development at the sub-national level 
include the development of secondary cities in Malaysia and Thailand, transportation 
capacity development in the lagging Brazilian Northeast, increased connectivity and 
accessibility to reduce geographical isolation of the northeast peninsula of Malaysia, and the 
transmigration programs in Indonesia, from the densely populated inner island to the less 
developed outer islands (Lall, 1996), and in Nepal, from the interior mountain regions to the 
Terai plains. Studies examining the role of publicly supplied infrastructure in economic 
growth were revived by Aschauer’s (1989) work on the United States and Biehl’s (1986) 
paper on the European Community, which suggest infrastructure investments have important 
productivity and growth effects. Antecedent research on infrastructure and economic growth, 
however, dates back to the work of Hirschman (1958) on theories of unbalanced growth and 
other development theories regarding the role of “economic and social overhead capital” in 
national and regional development (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurske, 1953; Nadiri, 1970). 
Lall, Shalizi, and Deichmann (2004) provide a recent overview of various studies examining 
the impact of transport infrastructure on productivity and test the impacts using firm level 
industrial data for India.  
 
The Brazilian government has made significant investments in infrastructure to 
integrate the national economy and lower business costs in peripheral regions. Most of the 
improvements in the road network occurred between the 1950s and 1980s, leading to 
significant reduction in transportation and logistics costs. Castro (2002) measures the benefits 
of improvements in highway infrastructure from the 1970-1995 change in equivalent paved 
road distance from each municipality to the state capital of São Paulo, accounting for the 
construction of the network as well as the difference in vehicle operating costs between 
earth/gravel and paved roads. He shows that transport cost reductions were quite significant 
for the Northern region and the Central region state of Mato Grosso, with numbers varying 
from 5,000 to 3,000 equivalent kilometers of paved road. Average reductions fall to the 1,000 
km range in the Central region states of Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul, the Southern states, 
and the Coastal Northeastern states. Not surprisingly, the numbers are close to zero in   11
municipalities close to São Paulo. Figure 2 shows these changes across microregions. It is 
clear in part A of the figure that the largest absolute equivalent distance reductions have 
taken place in the peripheral areas of the country. In comparison, part B of the figure shows 
relative improvements, which are calculated by dividing the change in equivalent distances 
by the initial equivalent distance in 1970. From this map, we see that the large transport 
improvements in the periphery do very little to offset the substantial barrier presented by 
distance to the core market and the Southeast, near the São Paulo region, possesses 
significant advantages under any imaginable improvements to the infrastructure. Using this 
measure, Castro (2002) finds that the reduction in interregional transport costs was one of the 
major determinants of both the expansion of agricultural production to the central regions of 
Brazil after the 1960s as well as increases in the country’s agricultural productivity. 
 
  In this analysis, we use the equivalent paved road distance between each microregion 
and the state capital of São Paulo in 1995 to examine the impacts of transport costs on the 
profitability of industrial firms in Brazil. The intuition behind using this measure is that if 
transport costs and access to markets matter for firm level profitability, we should see lower 
production costs in areas with relatively lower equivalent paved road distances to São Paulo. 
In other words, availability of interregional infrastructure linking firms (in peripheral 
regions) to large market areas should contribute to increase in profitability. 
 
2.3  Other sources of external economies – Economic Geography  
 
2.3.1  Own industry concentration  
 
Localization, the co-location of firms in the same industry generates externalities that 
enhance productivity of firms in that industry. The benefits of localization include sharing of 
sector-specific inputs, skilled labor, and knowledge, intra-industry linkages, and 
opportunities for efficient subcontracting among firms (Lall et. al, 2004). Firms that share 
specialized inputs and production technologies are more likely to cooperate in a variety of 
ways.   Furthermore, a large concentration of firms within the same industry increases 
possibilities for collective action to lobby regulators, or to bulk bid prices of intermediate 
products and other factors of production. There is considerable empirical literature 
supporting the positive effects of localization economies (Henderson 1988, and Ciccone and   12
Hall 1995). In a recent study of Korean industry, Henderson, Lee, and Lee. (2001) estimate 
scale economies using city level industry data for 1983, 1989, and 1991-93, and find 
localization economies of about 6 to 8 percent. This implies that a 1 percent increase in local 
own industry employment results in a 0.06-0.08 percent increase in plant output.   
 
Although industry concentration provides many benefits, some of these may be offset 
by higher input costs from enhanced competition between firms for labor and land. 
Coincident with higher productivity, wages and rents may rise and transport costs may 
increase due to congestion. Therefore, the net benefits of own industry concentration may be 
marginal for sectors with low skilled labor and standardized technologies.  
 
Several different metrics of  localization have been employed by agglomeration 
studies including single industry employment in the region, same industry establishments in 
the region, or an index of concentration that indicates disproportionate specialization of the 
region in the industry when compared to the nation. Measures such as single industry 
employment and the location quotient, an indicator of specialization, have been commonly 
used in empirical studies, but are problematic because they do not account for local 
differences in the industry’s firm-size distribution.  Single industry employment in a 
particular region may be due to common location of several similar firms or a single firm 
with many workers and the conventional measures treat both circumstances equally.  
Localization economies require interaction between firms so a more appropriate measure 
should recognize the importance of the number of firms in addition to the number of workers 
in an industry because both these factors affect the scope and scale of interaction.  
 
In this paper, we develop a measure of own industry concentration that adjusts 
industry employment in each region for the industry’s local firm-size distribution. This 
measure  ri e ~ is firm-size adjusted employment for industry i in region r, and is defined as:  
 
( ) ri ri ri h e e − = 1 ~  (1) 
   13
where  ∑ = =
n
j ij ri z h
1
2  is the Herfindahl index for industry i in region r and is calculated as the 
sum of squared firm shares of local industry employment and  ri e  is industry i’s  employment 
in region r.  Multiplying raw industry employment by  ) 1 ( ri h −  has the desired effect of 
penalizing regions that have “lumpy” industry employment, that is, few firms with many 
workers.  To illustrate the importance of controlling for firm-size distribution in the 
measurement of localization potential, let us consider the following two-region example. 
Total single industry employment in Region 1 is 200, distributed evenly across 10 firms. In 
this case, the Herfindahl index is 0.1 and adjusted employment  i 1 e ~  is 180.  The adjusted 
employment showing localization potential is nearly the same as pure employment, reflecting 
the considerable possibility for firm interaction. In comparison, total industry employment in 
Region 2 is also 200, but distributed between two firms, with the first firm having 180 
employees and the other firm with 20 employees. In this case, the Herfindahl is 0.82, and the 
adjusted employment  i 2 e ~  is 36. This example shows that a fewer number of firms and 
‘lumpy’ employment in one firm reduces the overall potential for localization economies. 
Thus, our measure  ri e ~  penalizes regions where employment is concentrated in a few firms. 
For the analysis, we calculate own industry concentration using employment and firm-size 




Spatial Concentration of Brazilian Industry 
 
We use the measure of own industry concentration  ri e ~  to examine the spatial 
distribution of industrial activity across Brazilian microregions. Figure 3 (see maps 1-12) 
shows concentration in each of the 12 study industries. The maps identify microregions that 
have adjusted industry employment greater than the mean adjusted industry employment for 
the 558 microregions. The areas shaded darker have adjusted employment figures that are 
between two and four standard deviations higher than the average for the nation.  
 
Clearly, most industrial activity is concentrated in the Central and Southeast regions 
of the country. Only nondurables, wood products, and nonmetallic mineral manufacturing 
                                                 
6 The RAIS dataset provides employment, firm size and earnings data by industry and municipio.   14
appear to have a few centers of industry in the North and Northeast regions. From these maps 
of  2001data, 40 years of regional development programs do not appear to have successfully 
established a large center of industry and manufacturing in the North or Northeast regions. 
The only exception to this rather bleak picture for the Northern region is Manaus, which has 
strong localization economies in most of our study industries -- non-durable manufacturing, 
wood products, printing & publishing, chemicals, rubber & plastic, nonmetallic minerals, 
metals, mechanical machinery, electrical & electronics, and transportation equipment. 
Manuas is the recipient of perhaps the most important tax incentive program in Brazil, the 
formation of a free trade zone (called the Zona Franca of Manaus, ZFM).  
 
The ZFM was established by the federal government in February 1967 with the 
objective of creating an industrial, commercial and farming center in the Amazon (Ferreira 
2003). The initial spatial scope of the ZFM was centered on the city of Manaus (a deepwater 
inland port on the Amazon River), and extended for more than 10 thousand km. The main 
instrument to attract economic activity was a lavish 30-year tax incentive program for firms 
located in the region through abatement or exemption of taxes on imports and industrial 
products. The incentives were designed to encourage exports, reducing rebates if the products 
from the Manaus Industrial Pole (PIM, for “Pólo Industrial de Manaus”) were to be sold 
within Brazil. An estimated US$375 million in import taxes and US$ 1.1 billion in industrial 
taxes were exempted in 1999 as part of the fiscal relief package (Fereirra 2003).  Although 
heavily subsidized, the ZFM has attained a considerable impact in terms of job creation, 
exports, and attraction of industrial firms. Manaus is a main center of electronic equipment 
factories in Brazil even though some of them, especially computer plants, are merely 
assembly lines for imported parts. Although the maps show a high concentration of economic 
activity in Manaus, the apparent absence of spillovers or multiplier effects to neighboring 
microregions is curious. In fact, all adjoining areas show very little evidence of industrial 
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2.3.2 Inter-Industry  Linkages 
 
In addition to intra-industry externality effects, we also include a measure to evaluate 
the importance of inter-industry linkages in explaining firm-level profitability and thereby, 
location decisions. Marshall (1890, 1919) first introduced the importance of inter-industry 
linkages as a major agglomerative force. Venables (1996) recently demonstrated that 
agglomeration could occur through the combination of firm location decisions and buyer-
supplier linkages even without high factor mobility. The presence of local suppliers can 
reduce transaction costs and therefore increase productivity. Inter-industry linkages can also 
serve as a channel for vital information transfers.  Firms that are linked through stable buyer-
supplier chains often exchange ideas on how to improve the quality of their products or on 
how to save production costs.  Such on-going interactions make the dynamics of inter-
industry externalities quite vibrant. Therefore, firms are likely to locate in regions with a 
strong presence of local suppliers to the extent the performance of an industry is highly 
dependent upon the supply of high-quality intermediate goods, for example, automobile 
manufacturing. The presence of local supplier linkages increases the efficiency of purchasing 
industries and reinforces the localization process. 
 
Several approaches for defining inter-industry linkages are available: input-output 
based, labor skill based, and technology flow based.  Although these approaches represent 
different aspects of industry linkages and the structure of a regional economy, the most 
common approach employs a national level input-output account as a template for identifying 
strengths and weaknesses in regional buyer-supplier linkages (Feser and Bergman, 2000).  
The strong presence or lack of nationally identified buyer-supplier linkages at the local level 





A firm’s proximity to sources of intermediate inputs to its own production can greatly 
affect its costs.  For an industry heavily dependent on intermediate goods and services as 
inputs to production, access to suppliers lowers transaction costs and increases the 
profitability of its firms.  Therefore, a spatial profit function should account for the variety   16
and magnitude of backward linkages in a region.  Commonly, backward linkages are 
measured as technical coefficients from a national industry by industry transactions table.  
Technical coefficients are defined as column industry purchases from the row industry 
divided by the sum of all column industry sales and relate the dollar value of intermediate 
purchases from the upstream sector required to produce a dollar of the column industry’s 
output.  Thus, the technical coefficient measures the degree of the column industry’s 
dependence on other industries for inputs to production. 
 
We measure the firm’s dependence on backward linkages as the sum of its industry’s 
backward linkages with all other relevant sectors.  For each column industry, backward 
linkages with each row industry are defined as the technical coefficient weighted by the 
region’s location quotient for the row industry.  A matrix of regionally weighted backward 
linkages is defined as 
 
()() () j   x   i i   x   r j   x   r Ω L = Λ    (2) 
 
where L is a region by industry matrix of location quotients for selling sectors and Ω  is a 
national direct requirements matrix of technical coefficients with purchasing industries as 
columns and supplying sectors as rows.  Each column vector of Λ  is a composite measure of 
the j
th industry’s backward linkages for regions r.  Therefore, a firm in region r and industry j 
has a measure of backward linkages  rj Λ . 
 
For Ω , we use a 1996 matrix of national technical coefficients published by the 
IBGE.








L    (3) 
 




                                                 
7 Matrix of National Technical Coefficients, Matriz dos Coeficientes Técnios Intersetoriais, 1996, IBGE.   17
2.3.3 Economic  Diversity 
 
Inter-industry externalities may also arise from classic Chinitz-Jacobs’ diversity (see 
the description in Lall, Koo and Chakravorty, 2003), in addition to buyer-supplier linkages. 
The diversity metric is a summary measure of urbanization economies that accrue across 
industrial sectors and benefit firms in the agglomeration without regard to specific industry. 
Chinitz (1961) and Jacobs (1969) proposed that important knowledge transfers primarily 
occur across industries and the diversity of the local industry mix is important for these 
external effects.   
 
The benefits of locating in a large diverse area go beyond the technology spillovers 
argument.  Firms in large cities have relatively better access to business services, such as 
banking, advertising, and legal services.  Particularly important in the diversity argument is 
the heterogeneity of economic activity.  On the consumption side, increasing the range of 
local goods that are available enhances the utility of consumers.  At the same time, the output 
variety in the local economy can affect the level of output on the production side (Abdel- 
Rahman, 1988; Fujita, 1989; Rivera-Batiz, 1988), that is, urban diversity can yield external 
scale economies through the variety of consumer and producer goods.  Recent empirical 
studies by Bostic (1997) and Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1993) show that diversity in 
economic activity has considerable bearing on the levels of regional economic growth.  The 
later type of benefit is particularly important in developing countries where most 
manufacturing industries are based on low skills and low wages but an abundant local labor 
supply. 
 
In this study, we use the industry-mix Herfindahl measure to examine the degree of 
economic diversity in each district.  The Herfindahl index of a region r, Hr, is the sum of 







( H ∑ =                                                           (4) 
 
Unlike measures of specialization that focus on one industry, the diversity index 
considers the industry mix of the entire regional economy.  The largest value for Hr is one 
when the entire regional economy is dominated by a single industry.  Therefore, a higher   18
value signifies less economic diversity.  For a more intuitive interpretation of the measure, 
the diversity index in our model, Hr, is subtracted from one so that DVr=1-Hr and a higher 
value of DVr signifies that the regional economy is relatively more diversified.  
 
 
3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
The empirical strategy involves estimating a cost function that includes a mix of 
micro firm-level variables along with measures of economic policy, infrastructure, and the 
region’s economic geography. Variables that are external to the firm’s direct production 
process are included in the estimation as we hypothesize that these are likely to influence its 
costs and profits in the form of pecuniary and technological externalities. After developing 
the estimation methodology, we also provide a short description of the firm level data used in 
the analysis. The underlying analytic strategy is based on the “New Economic Geography” 
literature, in which Krugman (1991a, 1991b) and Fujita et al. (1999) analytically model 
increasing returns stemming mostly from pecuniary externalities.   These models emphasize 
the importance of supplier and demand linkages and transportation costs, whereas firms 
prefer to produce each product in a single location given fixed production costs. Firms also 
prefer to locate their production facilities near large markets, given transportation costs. 
Thus, external economies and economic policy variables enter as additional variables in a 
cost function. 
 
A similar estimation strategy has been employed in Lall, Koo, and Chakravorty 
(2003) and Lall, Shalizi, and Deichmann (2004) for estimating the impact of agglomeration 
economies using firm-level data for Indian industry, and in Feser (2002) for analysis of 
external economies enjoyed by U.S. manufacturing firms.  
 
In this analysis, we employ a similar framework to estimate a spatial cost function 
and examine location and production choices in Brazilian industry. A traditional cost 
function for a firm i is (subscript i is dropped for simplicity): 
C = f(Y, w)        (5) 
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where C is the total cost of production for firm i, Y is its total output, and w is an n-
dimensional vector of input prices.  Fiscal incentives, infrastructure, external economies and 
other regional characteristics are also important in determining the firm’s cost structure.  
Costs for a firm are determined not only by its output and the pricing of its inputs, but also by 
ease of access to markets via reliable transportation networks, availability of a diverse input 
mix, localized externalities from similar firms in the region, and rebates in the form of fiscal 
incentives.  Such location-specific advantages have clear implications for a firm’s location 
decision because they create cost-saving externalities. We modify the basic cost function to 
include the influence of these external factors: 
  
Cr = f(Y, wr, Ar)      (6) 
 
where Cr is the total cost of a firm in microregion r, wr is an input price vector for the 
firm in microregion r, and A is a m-dimensional vector of external benefits at microregion r.
8 
 
The model includes four conventional inputs: capital, labor, energy, and materials 
(KLEM) so that the total cost is the sum of the four factor costs.  We also incorporate five 
sources of external economy at the microregion level by including (a) fiscal incentives, (b) 
infrastructure  in the form of equivalent road distance to São Paulo , (c) concentration of own 
industry employment, (d) strength of buyer-supplier linkages, and (e) relative diversity in the 
region in the model’s framework.  
 
Shephard’s lemma produces the optimal cost-minimizing factor demand function for 
input j corresponding to input prices as follows: 
) , , ( r r
jr
r






=   j = 1,2,3,4,....,n                             (7) 
 
where Xjr is the factor demand for j
th input of a firm in microregion r.  Clearly, the firm’s 
factor demand is determined by its output, factor prices, and location specific external 
economies.  Therefore, the production equilibrium is defined by a series of equations derived 
from equations (6) and (7). 
                                                 
8 The microregion is the unit of analysis in this study, and corresponds to a group of 5-6 municipios.   20
 
The empirical implementation of the model above is based on a translog functional 
form, which is a second-order approximation of any general cost function.  The translog 
specification provides considerable flexibility and imposes the fewest technical assumptions 
compared to other forms such as the Cobb-Douglas or the constant elasticity of substitution 
specifications (Christensen et al., 1973). A translog cost function with conventional inputs as 
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In addition to the external economy variables that directly enter the translog 
specification in the cost function (state-level fiscal incentives, transport costs, own industry 
concentration, backward linkages, and economic diversity), we include a dummy variable FD 
to examine if providing fiscal incentives at the municipio level has any effects on 
profitability. If ϕF is negative and significant, it would mean that local fiscal incentive 
provision matters in terms of reducing firm level costs. Finally, we introduce a dummy 
variable for the Northeast (di) to examine if costs in this region are any different from 
Nationwide estimates. 
 
From equation (7), the cost share of input factor j is  
 
l jy k jk k j j Y w S ln ln β β α + ∑ + =      (k=1-4)      (9)  
 
Notice that the cost share equations of all factor inputs satisfy the adding up criterion, ΣjSj=1.  
The “adding up criterion” has important implications for model estimation.  The system of 
cost share equations satisfies the “adding up criteria” if  
 
0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 1 = ∑ = ∑ = ∑ = ∑ = ∑ = ∑ jl j jl l jy j jk j jk k j j γ γ β β β α             (10) 
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thus reducing the number of free parameters to be estimated. 
 
The translog cost function can be directly estimated from Equation (8); however, a 
joint estimation of Equations (8) and (9) with Restriction (10) significantly improves the 
efficiency of the model.  
 
The impact of external factors on the cost structure, or profitability, of the firm can be 
evaluated by deriving the elasticity of costs with respect to the external economy variables. 
From Equation (8) the cost elasticities are: 
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3.1 Firm  Level  Data 
 
The translog specification of the production (cost) function requires an exogenous 
treatment of factor prices.  Unfortunately, we lack exogenous pricing data for the four 
production factors included in the model.  Therefore, we must rely on the “small player” 
assumption that an individual firm is a price taker and cannot significantly influence a 
region’s prevailing prices of capital, labor, energy, and materials (KLEM).  In general, the 
region’s prevailing price is defined as the average price of the factor for sampled firms in the 
microregion.    The necessary condition of factor price-taking behavior among firms is 
preserved insofar individual firms do not contribute significantly to their regional means. To 
ensure some homogeneity among the factors to be priced, mean prices are conditional on the 
firm’s 4-digit National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE) code. The prevailing 
price of KLEM for each firm is simply the average unit costs of capital, labor, energy, or 
materials for firms in the region with common 4-digit industry classifications. 
 
Capital. The prevailing price of capital in each region captures annual leasing rents for 
buildings and equipment paid by sampled firms in the microregion.  By excluding asset 
acquisition, we assume that leasing and purchasing markets are competitive.  Therefore, the   22
fraction of the value of accumulated capital stock that factor into production during the 
single, surveyed year is equivalent to its leasing price.  Although we avoid the potential 
arbitrariness of choosing a fixed amortization schedule for heterogeneous assets that 
depreciate at differing rates, the validity of our measure of capital rents rests on the 
reasonable assumption of competitive purchasing and leasing markets. 
 
We define prevailing regional prices of capital as the average annual lease and rental 
payments per dollar of output for a region’s firms in each 4-digit CNAE.  Unit capital cost 
for each firm in the sample is obtained by dividing annual lease payments by output.  The 
firm’s price of capital is the mean unit capital cost for firms in the same industry.  
 
Labor. The unit cost of labor is calculated by dividing the total wages and benefits paid by 
each firm to its workers employed in its industrial production by the average number of line 
workers for the year.  The result is the average annual line wage for each firm in the sample.  
The average annual line wage should capture the price of labor specific to each 4-digit 
CNAE better than total labor costs per worker because the former measure disregards some 
possible inefficiencies pertaining to management and other staffing indirectly involved in the 
firm’s production. A region’s prevailing wages are defined as mean average annual line 
wages for each industry. As there are differences in workers across industries with regard to 
skill and productivity, it is reasonable to expect that prevailing wages vary across industries.  
 
Energy. To price energy, we include the firms’ annual costs of fuel and electricity 
consumption.  Unit energy costs are calculated for each firm by dividing total expenditures 
on fuel and electricity by the firm’s total sales of the industrial products (output).  The 
prevailing energy price for each industry in each microregion is the average of unit energy 
costs.  
 
Materials. Data on the stock and flow of materials permit us to calculate the value of 
materials consumed during the production year.  The value of materials consumed equals the 
value of the material stock at the end of the previous year plus purchases during the surveyed 
year minus the value of stock at the end of the production year.  Unit material costs are the   23
value of the firm’s material consumption divided by its output.  Prevailing industry prices for 
materials in each region are defined as the average unit material cost for the 4-digit sector. 
 
The KLEM price measures provide reasonable assurance we are modeling factor 
price-taking behavior among firms in the PIA sample.   
 
 
4 RESULTS FROM THE ANALYSIS 
 
The empirical analysis is conducted by jointly estimating equations (8) and (9) as a system 
with equation (10) as a restriction. The estimation is conducted using an iterative seemingly 
unrelated regression (ITSUR) procedure. The underlying system is nonlinear, and is 
primarily derived from the structure of the input demands, as represented in equation (7). 
 
The ITSUR procedure estimates the parameters of the system, accounting for 
heteroscedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. As the 
cost shares sum to unity, n-1 share equations are estimated (where n is the number of 
production factors). The ITSUR estimates are asymptotically equivalent to maximum 
likelihood estimates and are invariant to the omitted share equation (Greene, 2000). All 
estimations were carried out with the MODEL procedure of the SAS system.  
 
As there is considerable variation in the way that firms use technology, make factor 
allocation decisions, and can benefit from external economies, we estimate models by firm 
size categories in addition to industry wide estimates. For example, smaller firms may be 
more reliant on timely and cost efficient access to buyers and suppliers, availability of 
ancillary services, inter firm non-technological externalities, and high quality infrastructure. 
In contrast, larger firms may be in a better position to internalize production of various 
intermediate goods, self-provide infrastructure, and stock higher inventories. Thus, they 
would be relatively less dependent on location based amenities and characteristics (Lall et. al. 
2003 and 2004). To make allowances for this heterogeneity, and test if in fact there are 
differences in production costs and the impact of economic geography and policy instruments 
across firms of different sizes, we classify firms into two categories: medium, and large.   24
Medium sized are between 30 and 99 employees and large firms have 100 or more 
employees. The number of firms by size category, along with the average number of 
employees, unit costs, and output per worker is reported in Table 1. As the PIA data is a 
census of all firms with more than 30 employees, the data include all industrial activities in 
the sector. 
 
4.1 Fiscal  Incentives 
 
 
The first three columns of Table 2 provide the cost elasticities of fiscal incentives, with the 
industry-wide elasticities in the first column followed by elasticities for medium and large- 
sized firms. The impacts (cost elasticities) of fiscal incentives are estimated using the 
specification equation (11). The last three columns of this table provide estimates of ϕF (from 
equation 8), which tests if whether or not a municipio offers fiscal incentives matters in terms 
of reducing firm level costs. As in the case of the cost elasticities, industry-wide estimates are 
followed by estimates for medium and large sized firms.  
 
Let us first consider how federal fiscal incentives offered at the State level influence 
firms level costs. The intuition behind using this variable is that if a firm is located in a State 
that offers incentives specific to its own industry, then there is a greater likelihood that the 
firm will use these incentives to offset production costs. Thus, higher incentives amounts 
would translate into lower production costs.  
 
There is considerable variation in the impact of incentives across sectors and firm 
sizes. The industry-wide results show that fiscal incentives have a statistically significant cost 
reducing effect in four of the twelve study sectors. These are Non Durable manufacturing, 
Leather products, Rubber and Plastic, and Metals. For example, the cost elasticity in the 
Rubber and Plastic industry is -0.07, which means that doubling the availability of fiscal 
incentives will be associated with a 7% decrease in firm level costs. Similarly, the cost 
elasticity for Leather products is about -0.144 and for Non Durable Manufacturing is -0.026. 
In contrast to these cost reducing effects, we get a rather counter-intuitive results for the   25
Chemicals and Non Metallic Minerals sectors, where providing incentives increases firm 
level costs by 6.6% and 2.4% respectively.  
 
Disaggregating the results by firm size, for medium sized firms we find that cost 
elasticities are negative and significant in four industry sectors, which are the same sectors as 
in the case of the industry-wide estimates. The estimated elasticities are also similar in terms 
of magnitude of the effects:  -0.032 for Non Durable manufacturing, -0.122 for Leather,         
-0.064 for Rubber and Plastic, and -0.032 for Metals. For the Leather industry, this means 
that on average, doubling the amount of sector specific fiscal incentives available at the State 
level would be associated with a 12.2% reduction in firm level costs for medium sized firms. 
In addition to these cost reductions, we also find cost increases associated with State level 
incentive provision in the Chemicals (9%) and Non Metallic Minerals industries (2%).  
 
For large size firms, availability of fiscal incentives are associated with cost 
reductions in three industry sectors – Printing and Publishing, Rubber and Plastic, and 
Metals. For instance, the cost elasticity for Printing and Publishing is 0.065, which means 
that a doubling the level of State level fiscal incentives would be associated with a 6.5% 
reduction in cost for the average large firm in the sector. In contrast to the medium sized 
firms, there are no sectors that show statistically significant cost increases associated with 
fiscal incentives.  
 
The last three columns of Table 2 provide parameter estimates for ϕF (equation 8). 
From these estimates, it is clear that the indicator variable of ‘whether or not a municipio 
offers fiscal incentives’ does not have any significant effect on firm level costs. The only 
exception appears to be for the (industry wide) Wood Products sector, where firms in 
municipios offering fiscal incentives have about 6.7% lower costs than other similar firms. 
We must point out that the indicator variable is rather crude, and does not tell us anything 
about the sectoral distribution of incentives.  
 
In general, the results reported in Table 2 show that the impacts of fiscal incentives 
are quite modest. For the most part, availability of fiscal incentives do not matter in terms of   26
reducing firm level costs. In particular, sectors requiring considerable capital outlays such as 
Mechanical Machinery, Transportation Equipment, and Electrical and Electronics 
components do not respond to the availability of these incentives. This could be due to: (a) 
the size and composition of the incentive package is not sufficient to offset expenditures to 
produce in peripheral or lagging regions, or  (b) most firms do not have access to these 
incentives even when these are available at the State level (i.e. discretionary incentives are 
targeted only to a few firms). More detailed analysis with firm level fiscal incentives data 
would be required to identify the exact reasons why fiscal incentives do not have a 
significant impact on cost reductions. When fiscal incentives are statistically significant, the 
estimated elasticities are quite small, which would suggest that the net benefits from fiscal 
incentives would be inadequate to enhance profitability or induce relocation to peripheral 
locations.  
 
4.2  Transport Infrastructure  
 
We provide the cost elasticities (calculated from equation 11) for transport costs in 
Table 3. The first column provides industry-wide estimates followed by elasticities for 
medium and large sized firms. As described earlier in the paper, the transport cost variable 
measures the equivalent paved road distance from the microregion to São Paulo. We expect 
that firms that have lower equivalent paved road distances
9 to São Paulo (the largest market 
in the country) would incur lower costs as they can reduce transport costs to supply markets 
and satisfy demand. In addition to the pure pecuniary benefits from reducing transport costs, 
availability of good infrastructure linking firms to market centers increases the increases the 
potential for input diversity, increases probability of technology diffusion through interaction 
and knowledge spillovers between firms, as well as between firms and research centers. 
Thus, improved accessibility (though lower transport costs) has the effect of reducing 
geographic barriers to interaction, which increases specialized labor supply and facilitates 
information exchange, technology diffusion and other beneficial spillovers that have a self-
reinforcing effect (see Henderson et. al 2001, Lall et. al 2004; McCann 1998, for a detailed 
discussion on this issue).  
                                                 
9 The equivalent road distance measure can be reduced with higher inter regional infrastructure endowments 
linking the region to São Paulo.   27
 
Let us now look at the estimated elasticities for the transport variable reported in 
Table 3. The industry-wide estimates are positive and statistically significant for eight of the 
12 study sectors. These sectors are Non-durable manufacturing, Garment and Textiles, 
Leather products, Wood products, Chemicals, Nonmetallic Minerals, Metals, and Mechanical 
Machinery.  This means that cost increases are associated with higher equivalent road 
distances to São Paulo. Or in other words, lower higher equivalent road distances to São 
Paulo are associated with lower firm level costs. There is considerable heterogeneity in the 
magnitude of the elasticities, ranging from about 0.06 in the Metals sector to 0.24 for Leather 
and Wood products.  We see similar patterns and magnitudes for medium sized firms. In 
contrast, large firms do not exhibit significant sensitivity to transport costs – the elasticities 
are only statistically significant for Leather Products (0.34) and Mechanical Machinery 
(0.16). 
 
These results provide evidence to support the hypothesis that infrastructure 
improvements linking firm to market centers lead to considerable benefits at the firm level. 
This is particularly the case in standardized manufacturing sectors, where improvements in 
interregional transport infrastructure that would reduce the “equivalent paved” distance to 
São Paulo improve proximity to markets and suppliers, and will be associated with cost 
reductions at the firm level. In comparison, many industries with significant process or 
product innovation components may be relatively less sensitive to transport costs compared 
to benefits from localization or urbanization (this is one explanation for why electrical and 
electronics manufacturing do not show net benefits from proximity to São Paulo).  
 
4.3 Regional  Characteristics 
 
Summary results showing the impact of regional characteristics (economic 
geography) are reported in Table 4.  Estimates reported in Table 4 are cost elasticities, as 
defined in equation (11). As in the previous tables, we provide results for the industry in 
general, followed by specific parameter estimates for medium, and large firms. There are 
three sets of estimates in this table  (a) own industry concentration, (c) backward linkages   28
and (c) local economic diversity. The results for each industry sector are provided in four 
parts. In general, the cost elasticities show that there is considerable heterogeneity in the 
impact of location characteristics on firm level costs. This heterogeneity is not limited to the 
overall effects across industries, but also includes differences across firms of different sizes 
and by sources of agglomeration economies.  
 
Own Industry Concentration: First among the regional characteristics variables is 
own industry concentration, which is measured as by adjusting industry employment in each 
region with the industry’s local firm -size distribution. If own industry concentration 
provides cost saving externalities to the firm, then the estimated elasticities should be 
negative. The industry-wide estimates show that while eight industry sectors exhibit negative 
elasticities with respect to own industry concentration, these are significant in only two 
sectors – Printing and Publishing, and Transportation Equipment. In the case of Printing and 
Publishing, the estimated elasticity of –0.149 means that a doubling of own industry 
concentration will reduce firm level costs by approximately 15%. In contrast to these cost 
saving externalities from own industry concentration, we get positive and statistically 
significant estimates for four industry sectors. These are Non-durable manufacturing, 
Garment & Textiles, Leather products, and Nonmetallic minerals. These positive elasticities 
suggest that own industry concentration is congesting and increases aggregate costs at the 
firm level. For medium sized firms, the estimated elasticities are positive for the same 
industry sectors. In contrast, the cost saving savings are only significant for medium sized 
firms in the Transportation Equipment industry. For large firms, the estimated elasticities for 
own industry concentration are not statistically significant for any industry sector.  
 
 Backward Linkages: The findings on the impact of backward linkages or proximity 
to suppliers are quite mixed. The industry-wide estimates are negative for three sectors (Non 
Durable manufacturing, Garments and Textiles, and Electrical and Electronics), positive for 
one sector and insignificant for the other eight sectors. These findings imply that the 
availability of spatially proximate buyers and supplier (sources of backward linkages) have 
differential impacts across industry sectors. The cost savings (negative elasticities) for 
Electrical and Electronics are in the range of 17% compared to 2.7% in Garments and   29
Textiles. On the other hand, there are cost increases (positive elasticites) of 6.1% for Leather 
Products, implying that a greater concentration of inter-industry linkages tends to enhance 
firm level costs.  
 
When we disaggregate the results by firm size, we find that for medium-sized firms, 
net cost savings are observed for Non Durable Manufacturing and Garments and Textiles, 
and there are cost increases for the Leather Products industry. Estimated elasticities are not 
significant for the other sectors. For large firms, the estimated elasticities are significant for 
only one industry sector – Non Durable Manufacturing, where the elasticity of –0.08 
signifies cost savings associated with proximity to suppliers. 
 
Economic Diversity: Similar to the estimated elasticities for Backward Linkages, 
there are considerable differences in the results for economic diversity across sectors. For the 
most part, the Economic Diversity variable has no net impact on firm level costs. When we 
look at estimates for all firms, we find a negative and significant elasticity for the 
Transportation equipment sector, where the estimate of –13.92 means that costs for a 
representative firm in this sector would reduce 14 times with a doubling of diversity. While 
this appears to be a very large elasticity, we should keep in mind that any change in the 
diversity of the economy involves a large or structural change in the nature and size 
distribution of economic activities. The gain to firms in the Transport Equipment sector from 
this source of externality primarily stems from the fact that demand for transport related 
services increases when there are many sectors in the economy, and that many industries 
cluster in areas which have good access to transport networks and services. In comparison, 
diversity increases costs for firms in the Garments & Textiles, Nonmetallic Minerals, and 
Mechanical Machinery sectors. The increase in net costs due to diversity can partly be 
explained by the fact that the costs of higher wages and rents from being located in large and 
diverse areas outweigh the benefits of inter-industry linkages and expansion of local demand.  
 
For medium sized firms, the benefits of diversity are observed in the Wood Products 
sector. While the elasticity for the Transport Equipment sector is negative, it is not 
statistically significant in this case. Net costs from diversity are observed for the same three   30
sectors as in the case of the estimates for all firms. The results for large firms show that there 
are considerable gains from diversity in the Printing & Publishing and Transportation 
Equipment sectors. The magnitude of the impacts of diversity is bigger for larger firms in 
Transport Equipment (-18.4) compared to the industry-wide estimates. In comparison, there 
are no statistically significant costs associated with diversity.  
 
In general, we find considerable variation in the impact of regional characteristics 
across industry sectors and firm sizes. While there are no clear patterns that emerge from this 
part of the analysis,  there are a few parameters that are worth exploring in future research. 
First, for industries that depend on local demand such as Printing & Publishing and 
Transportation Equipment, localization and urbanization economies tend to be cost reducing. 
Second, for other standardized industries such as Non-durables, Garments & Textiles , 
Leather, Metals,  Non Metallic Minerals and Mechanical Machinery, localization and 
urbanization economies are congesting as they tend to push up wages and rents without the 
compensating returns from these sources of externalities. Thus, these industries would tend to 
locate in smaller or more specialized areas but have access to large markets (see the positive 






Many countries have large and sustained differences in sub-national living conditions and 
economic performance. Various policy instruments such as infrastructure improvements and 
fiscal incentives have been used to alter the national economic landscape and in the process 
encourage the growth of lagging sub national regions. However, it is unclear whether in most 
instances, these interventions have improved development outcomes of these regions. In this 
paper, we examine whether infrastructure improvements and fiscal incentives reduce firm 
level costs, thereby influencing firms to locate and produce in areas offering these benefits? 
We also examine whether regional characteristics in the form of own industry concentration, 
spatially proximate inter-industry linkages, and regional economic diversity reduce costs for 
individual firms.  
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In general, we find that lower transport costs or improvement in access to markets are 
associated with reductions in firm level costs. This means that firms located in areas with 
relatively better market access (measured as the equivalent paved road distance to São Paulo) 
tend to have lower costs compared with similar firms in that industry. In comparison, the 
effects of fiscal incentives are quite small. In general, provision of state level (sector specific) 
fiscal incentives does not reduce firm level costs. This is particularly the case for sectors 
requiring considerable capital outlays, such as mechanical machinery, transportation 
equipment, and electrical and electronics. Even when the impacts of fiscal incentives are 
statistically significant, the estimated elasticities are small enough to suggest that they would 
be inadequate to enhance profitability or induce relocation to peripheral locations. There is 
considerable inter-industry variation in the impact of regional characteristics. However, 
localization and urbanization economies are relatively more important for industries that 
depend on local suppliers and demand, such as printing and publishing and transportation 
equipment. 
 
  What do these results mean for the development of lagging regions? Would the 
empirical estimates supporting cost reductions through interregional infrastructure 
improvements be the key for developing the lagging Northeast? Most probably not, and for 
the following reasons. As most of the study industries produce standardized products, 
consumers will purchase products based on price and possibly quality differentials. Further, 
existing firms located in agglomerations accrue scale economies from transport savings and 
the diversity of input supply. Inter-regional transport improvements that improve the 
Northeast’s linkages with the rest of the country will implicitly reduce a natural tariff barrier. 
Thus, firms serving larger markets (such as non-basic goods producers in the Southeast) and 
benefiting from economies of scale and lower unit costs of production can more easily 
expand into new markets in competition with local producers when the unit cost of 
distribution between two points is lowered.  In the case where manufactured goods are 
standardized and product substitution is relatively costless, instead of manufacturing activity 
moving to or being created in the Northeast (we may however see a few firms move or start 
up)
10, we are likely to see that producers in the leading regions (such as São Paulo) will 
                                                 
10 These are likely to be in basic industries serving local demand.    32
expand production and crowd out local producers in the lagging region.
11 This may benefit 
local consumers in the short run but it will be detrimental for local production and 
employment. Thus, it is difficult to say whether transport improvements are likely to have 
much development impact on the Northeast. 
 
  So what should regional development policy look like? Let us first reiterate that 
competition in standardized products is unlikely to be the future for lagging regions, 
especially if production of these standardized products is already concentrated or 
agglomerated in the leading region, and these products exhibit some degree of increasing 
returns to scale. In this context, it may be worth thinking of industry sectors where the 
lagging region has comparative advantage – either due to location or (non oil/ mineral) local 
/regional endowments, or those that have not yet agglomerated in the leading region. In these 
cases, development of upstream and downstream industries along with inter-regional and 
local infrastructure improvements may create new markets and growth prospects. More 
research on barriers to local development (such as local infrastructure bottlenecks) and new 











                                                 
11 There are ‘tipping points’ for industry location in agglomerations when congestion costs and wages are high 
enough to offset net economies from agglomeration. However, these diseconomies are likely to decongest or 
de-concentrate in the form of spillover developments in areas that are well connected to buyers and suppliers. 
As figure 2 shows, even though there have been considerable nationwide transport improvements over the past 
30-40 years, these have been relatively higher in areas near major market centers, such as Sao Paulo. Thus, 
connectivity through transport improvements is higher in areas that are also geographically close to the large 
markets.    33
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Table 1: Mean (Standard Deviation) Employment, Unit Costs, and Output per Worker, Sampled Brazil 
Firms, 2001  
Sector Number  of 
firms 
Unit Costs (R$) 
 





   Mean  Std. 
Dev 
Mean  Std. Dev Mean  Std. Dev 
All firms  20499 0.951  0.755 128.512  346.805  134.995  476.025 
Medium firms  15257  0.963  0.774 111.875  348.829  43.730 21.838 
Large firms  5242  0.917  0.696  176.937  336.226  400.626  888.843 
Nondurables  2829 1.015  0.987  167.576  425.023  190.945  763.499 
Medium firms  1964  1.040  0.891 146.922  474.467  40.265 22.994 
Large firms  865  0.958  1.174  214.469  276.835 533.067 1,318.342 
Garment & Textiles  2883 0.988  0.450 56.953  105.281  121.392  435.390 
Medium firms  2217  0.998  0.471 55.377  115.302  42.593  21.674 
Large firms  666  0.956  0.371  62.199  60.818  383.701  854.614 
Leather  1136 0.883  0.330 64.274  223.263  193.922  669.251 
Medium firms  802  0.911  0.372 64.990  261.939  48.949  22.126 
Large firms  334  0.816  0.180  62.554 69.667  542.030  1,163.303 
Wood  1135 0.894  0.517 40.890 54.266  90.575  146.822 
Medium firms  907  0.903  0.534 36.774 47.304  44.845  20.979 
Large firms  228  0.858  0.443  57.263  73.776  272.496  253.644 
Printing & Publishing  1222 0.965  1.560  136.447  249.536  119.714  253.368 
Medium firms  897  0.967  1.715 114.685  242.432  44.237 22.468 
Large firms  325  0.956  1.014  196.509  259.220  328.031  425.703 
Chemicals  1261 0.914  0.487  410.290  691.754  123.822  233.084 
Medium firms  919  0.924  0.494 368.639  655.988  43.439 23.010 
Large firms  342  0.888  0.467  522.213  769.711  339.822  367.574 
Rubber & Plastic  1574 0.950  0.400  101.232  155.792  101.720  212.076 
Medium firms  1195  0.957  0.439 92.817  159.335  45.079  21.274 
Large firms  379  0.930  0.236  127.766  140.994  280.311  378.961 
Nonmetallic Mineral  1446 0.915  0.635 74.472  182.078  92.072  184.680 
Medium firms  1176  0.911  0.487 57.592  171.704  43.355  20.474 
Large firms  270  0.930  1.063  147.993  206.483  304.263  354.702 
Metals  2060 0.948  0.684  128.515  524.293  121.913  359.937 
Medium firms  1587  0.960  0.734 114.356  581.254  44.011 21.182 
Large firms  473  0.908  0.477  176.021  246.836  383.288  689.044 
Mechanical Machinery  1446 0.902  0.426  137.108  211.779  118.152  303.179 
Medium firms  1107  0.910  0.457 130.957  222.098  44.529 21.698 
Large firms  339  0.875  0.306  157.197  172.639  358.566  561.870 
Electrical & Electronics  817 0.968  1.002  225.425  451.514  172.466  503.234 
Medium firms  539  0.969  1.030 188.924  394.711  43.499 22.573 
Large firms  278  0.968  0.948  296.195  538.832  422.514  806.173 
Transport Equipment  773 0.932  0.338  127.706  194.085 280.741 1,116.630 
Medium firms  471  0.946  0.386 94.781  179.110  47.756  21.956 
Large firms  302  0.909  0.245  179.055  205.376 644.106 1,726.200 
 
Source:  2001 PIA 
 






Table 2: Impacts of Fiscal Incentives on Firm Level Costs 
 
 
Elasticities calculated from 
equation (11) 
ϕF 
    All Medium  Large  All Medium  Large 
Non-durable manufacturing  -0.026 -0.032 0.006 -0.019 -0.018 0.009
Garment & Textiles  0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003  0.019 0.002
Leather product  -0.144 -0.122 -0.056 0.043 0.050 0.043
Wood products  0.001 -0.014 0.005 -0.067 -0.061 -0.047
Printing & Publishing  0.002 0.025 -0.065 0.064 0.066 -0.034
Chemicals 0.066 0.090 -0.031 -0.006 -0.038 -0.039
Rubber & Plastic  -0.070 -0.064 -0.049 -0.027 -0.014 -0.038
Nonmetallic Mineral  0.024 0.023 0.002 -0.004 0.034 -0.028
Metals  -0.040 -0.032 -0.044 0.016 0.043 -0.074
Mechanical Machinery  -0.003 -0.011 0.020 0.077  0.095 0.017
Electrical & Electronics  0.039 0.052 0.026 -0.047 -0.036 -0.126
Transportation Equipment  0.015 0.031 -0.011 -0.048 -0.032 -0.029




Table 3: Impacts of Transport Costs  
 
Elasticities calculated from 
equation (11) 
All Medium  Large 
Non-durable manufacturing   0.112 0.121 0.041
Garment & Textiles  0.166 0.158 0.067
Leather product  0.235 0.211 0.343
Wood products  0.237 0.231 0.103
Printing & Publishing  0.012 0.070 -0.034
Chemicals 0.087 0.026 0.093
Rubber & Plastic  0.045 0.036 0.034
Nonmetallic Mineral  0.144 0.154 -0.003
Metals 0.059 0.083 0.039
Mechanical Machinery  0.150 0.120 0.162
Electrical & Electronics  -0.017 -0.023 -0.024
Transportation Equipment  0.057 0.045 -0.097
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at 1%, coefficients underlined are 
significant at 5%. 
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Own Industry Employment - 
Localization  Backward Linkages - IO  Manufacturing Diversity 
  All Medium  Large All Medium  Large All Medium  Large 
Non-durable manufacturing   0.095 0.076 0.095 -0.071 -0.044  -0.080 0.088 0.095 -0.054
Garment & Textiles  0.111 0.110 -0.060 -0.027 -0.024 0.002 0.726 0.949 0.753
Leather product  0.086 0.094 -0.015 0.061 0.064 0.026 -0.330 -0.649 -0.101
Wood products  -0.004 -0.010 -0.040 -0.010 0.010  0.040 -0.064 -2.758 0.051
Printing & Publishing  -0.149 -0.135 0.085 0.041 0.068 -0.102 -0.437 2.563 -3.406
Chemicals -0.020 -0.010 -0.116 -0.004 -0.042 -0.031 -2.875 -3.413 -8.711
Rubber & Plastic  -0.045 -0.031 -0.059 -0.034 -0.032 -0.029 2.322 2.786 1.517
Nonmetallic Mineral  0.121 0.147 -0.028 -0.021 -0.029 0.129 1.026 0.923 0.791
Metals -0.032 -0.032 -0.002 0.013 0.044 0.011 2.357 1.234 2.130
Mechanical Machinery  -0.019 -0.024 0.012 0.039 0.016  0.072 8.767 6.496 20.434
Electrical & Electronics  -0.061 -0.090 -0.034 -0.171 -0.184 -0.275 6.569 7.519 -1.532
Transportation Equipment  -0.102 -0.120 -0.066 -0.064 -0.058 -0.140 -13.942 -7.125 -18.410
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